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1. Initial triggers: US and Five Eyes access to bulk data  
 
In 2006, it was revealed that the US Treasury had procured access to worldwide scriptural bank trans-
actions by means of administrative subpoenas vis-à-vis the US hub of the (Belgium-based) Society for 
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) in the context of (inter alia) combating the 
financing of terrorism. Moreover, SWIFT itself defected herein, as its US hub did not endorse the so-
called Safe Harbour principles. These had been developed in 2000 by the European Commission2 to 
ensure that, given that the US data protection regime in itself could not be qualified as adequate, 
commercial EU-US data transfers would nonetheless be enabled. Companies that indicated (and self-
certified) their compliance with the principles laid down in the Commission’s Safe Harbour Decision, 
were to be considered as – from a data protection perspective – ‘safe harbours’ within US territory, to 
which EU companies were allowed to transfer data. This, however, was not the case for the SWIFT hub 
in the US, so that the Belgian company should have refrained from localizing (backup) data in it. The 
EU’s response to this scandal was far from convincing. While intra-European payment transactions 
were admittedly no longer sent to the US hub (albeit that in the meantime SWIFT had registered it as 
a ‘safe harbour’), the Commission negotiated on behalf of the EU an agreement with the US, i.e. the 
2010 TFTP-agreement (Terrorist Financing Tracking Program3), allowing the US Treasury, via a Europol 
‘filter’ (which painfully lacks proper filtering capacity) to obtain bulk access on a case-by-case basis to 
the intra-European payment transactions. The TFTP-agreement furthermore contains an article in 
which the US Treasury is axiomatically deemed adequate in terms of data protection.4 Notwithstand-
ing this, and given the known practice of wide data-sharing between US government administrations 
and bodies contrary to the European purpose-limitation principle, the inadequacy of the US data pro-
tection regime – from a European data protection perspective - was at the time beyond doubt. That 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)5, amended post-9/11 with the Patriot Act6 and further 
expanded in 20087 (FISA Amendments Act), allowed the US to monitor – either with or without a court 
order – electronic communication in a way that was disproportionate, worldwide and in bulk, was clear 
as well. This and more was confirmed in the Summer of 2013 with the revelations of whistleblower 
Edward Snowden. These revelations proved particularly shocking because of the revealed extent of the 
interception practices of the NSA (National Security Agency) – inter alia through the PRISM and Up-
stream programmes – and the British intelligence service GCHQ’s (Government Communications 
Headquarters) – which for years had spied on Belgacom International Carrier Service (Bics). As a sub-
sidiary of Belgium-based (tele)communications provider Proximus, Bics provides worldwide hardware 
through which telecom companies and government agencies run their electronic communication (in-
ternet-, telephony-, mobile- and texting-traffic). Moreover, the intense mutual cooperation between 
the NSA and GCHQ, and within the so-called Five Eyes Community, was confirmed by the revelations, 
although many were well aware that these five, within the context of Echelon, had been monitoring 
worldwide satellite communications for decades, including for commercial purposes. Already in 2000, 
the European Parliament had instigated an investigative commission against these practices. From the 
US side, the publication of NSA-newsletters in the Summer of 2015 as a result of the Snowden revela-
tions, confirmed these allegations. 
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2. CJEU standard setting, invalidating both US and EU generalised data retention practices   
 
In response to the appeal of Max Schrems against the Irish Data Protection Commissioner (in proceed-
ings against Facebook, that has its European HQ in Dublin), the Irish High Court had requested a pre-
liminary ruling by the CJEU, namely as to whether the Irish privacy commissioner (as it had itself up-
held) was bound by the Safe Harbour Decision of the Commission to the extent that it could no longer 
be questioned whether the US data protection regime was adequate, as such leading the Irish privacy 
commissioner to conclude that it could not investigate the complaint filed by Schrems. The latter had 
argued the contrary, based on the post-Snowden ascertainment that Facebook was active in the 
PRISM-programme, regardless of its self-certification under the Safe Harbour principles). The CJEU, in 
its preliminary ruling of 6 October 2015 in Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner,8 re-
called, with explicit reference to its Data Retention judgment of 8 April 2014 in Digital Rights Ireland9 
(in which it had declared the EU Data Retention Directive invalid) and its earlier judgments as cited 
under points 54 & 55 of its Data Retention judgment, its consistent case-law that “EU legislation in-
volving interference with the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter [regard-
ing the respect for private and family life and the protection of personal data respectively] must, ac-
cording to the Court’s settled case-law, lay down clear and precise rules governing the scope and ap-
plication of a measure […]” [emphasis added] (para. 91). Still with reference to the Data Retention 
judgment (and the case-law cited under point 52 thereof), the CJEU jointly stated that “furthermore 
and above all, protection of the fundamental right to respect for private life at EU level requires dero-
gations and limitations in relation to the protection of personal data to apply only in so far as is strictly 
necessary” [emphasis added] (para. 92), whereby clearly “[l]egislation is not limited to what is strictly 
necessary where it authorises, on a generalised basis, storage of all the personal data of all the persons 
whose data has been transferred from the European Union to the United States without any differen-
tiation, limitation or exception being made in the light of the objective pursued and without an objec-
tive criterion being laid down by which to determine the limits of the access of the public authorities 
to the data, and of its subsequent use, for purposes which are specific, strictly restricted and capable 
of justifying the interference which both access to that data and its use entail’ [emphasis added] (para. 
93).  
Given the fact that the Commission had omitted to implement such an assessment in its Safe Harbour 
Decision, the CJEU, in the Schrems case, decided on the invalidity of the latter, prompting the European 
Commission to initiate a replacement instrument, i.e. the EU-US Privacy Shield, based on a correspond-
ing ‘adequacy’ decision adopted by the European Commission on 12 July 2016. 
According to this decision, intelligence operations concerning sigint (signals intelligence, or the inter-
ception of electronic communication) under PPD-28 (the US Presidential Policy Directive 28 of 17 Jan-
uary 2014),10 shall always be 'as tailored as feasible' (para. 71 decision), and members of the intelli-
gence community [emphasis added] 'should require that, wherever practicable, collection should be 
focused on specific foreign intelligence targets or topics through the use of discriminants (e.g. specific 
facilities,  selection terms  and  identifiers' (para. 70 decision). There is a little too much of 'should' in 
this sentence for it to be genuinely convincing. Also, 'wherever practicable' is both very conditional and 
open-ended, and the mere use of 'discriminants' evidently does not guarantee compliance with strict 
necessity and proportionality requirements. At the very most, they imply that bulk collection will not 
take place without at least some form of selection. Furthermore, the US engagements coming from 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) recognise without much ado that bulk-sigint 
will remain possible under 'certain' circumstances, ‘for instance in order to identify and assess new or 
emerging threats' (para. 72 decision) or ‘due to technical or operational reasons'. Reference can also 
be made to the feasibility report (referred to in footnote 71 of the decision) presented to former Pres-
ident Obama by the Director of National Intelligence with reference to the possibility of developing 
software that would make it easier for the intelligence community to 'rather conduct targeted instead 
of bulk-collection' [emphasis added], which concluded that there is no software-based alternative to 
replace bulk-collection entirely.  
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Un-surprisingly, the Privacy Shield is already facing legal challenges before the CJEU, following two 
actions for annulment filed on 16 September and 25 October 2016 in cases brought by Digital Rights 
Ireland11  respectively La Quadrature du Net and Others12 against the Commission, which hereafter is 
being referred to where relevant. The 4th plea in law relied on by Digital Rights Ireland alleges that the 
provisions of the FISA Amendments Act “constitute legislation permitting public authorities to have 
access on a generalised basis to the content of electronic communications and consequently are not 
concordant with Article 7 of the Charter […]” [emphasis added]. The generalised nature of collections 
allowed under the US regulatory regime is also the core element underlying the 1st plea in law put 
forward by La Quadrature du Net and Others, leading them to conclude that the adequacy decision 
infringes Article 7 of the Charter by not drawing the conclusion that such “access on a generalised basis 
to the content of electronic communications” compromises the essence of the fundamental right to 
respect for private life. The plea in law draws on several paragraphs of the revised decision itself:  “[…] 
PPD-28 explains that Intelligence Community elements must sometimes collect bulk signals intelligence 
in certain circumstances, for instance in order to identify and assess new or emerging threats […]” 
[emphasis added] (para. 72); “According to the representations from the ODNI, even where the Intel-
ligence Community cannot use specific identifiers to target collection, it will seek to narrow the collec-
tion ‘as much as possible’ […]” [emphasis added] (para. 73); “[…] Targeted collection is clearly priori-
tised, while bulk collection is limited to (exceptional) situations where targeted collection is not possi-
ble for technical or operational reasons. […]” [emphasis added] (para. 76).  
Also the Irish High Court, in its judgment of 3 October 2017 (para. 193), in the case between the Irish 
Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd. and Maximillian Schrems, referring the issue of 
the validity of the Standard Contractual Clauses underlying personal data transfers from Facebook Ire-
land to Facebook Inc. (US) to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling,13 unambiguously established that “[o]n 
the basis of [the] definition [in Directive 95/46] and the evidence in relation to the operation of the 
PRISM and Upstream programmes authorised under s. 702 of FISA, it is clear that there is mass indis-
criminate processing of data by the Unites States government agencies, whether this is described as 
mass or targeted surveillance” [emphasis added]. Even if, for Upstream, it may well be the case that 
“mass searching […] is for targeted communications and […] in that sense not indiscriminate, […] it 
involves the collection of non-relevant data […]”, so the Court held, thereby confirming the essential 
difference between “bulk searching” v “bulk acquisition, collection or retention” (para. 192) [emphasis 
added].  
Of critical relevance in terms of data retention standard setting is also the CJEU’s preliminary ruling of 
21 December 2016 in Tele2 Sverige AB on data retention under the EU’s ePrivacy Directive,14 in which 
it holds that “general and indiscriminate retention of traffic data and location data is inacceptable, 
leaving member states the possibility for only “targeted” (para. 108) retention of traffic and location 
data, meaning that such retention must then be defined also in terms of the “public […] that may 
potentially be affected” (para. 110-111) and on the basis of “objective evidence which makes it pos-
sible to identify a public whose data is likely to reveal a link, at least an indirect one, with serious 
criminal offences, and to contribute in one way or another to fighting serious crime or to preventing a 
serious risk to public security” (para. 111).  
With its Tele2 Sverige AB ruling, the CJEU has, even in a clearer fashion than in its 2014 Data retention 
judgment, formally invalidated indiscriminate data collection, storage or retention, irrespective of later 
access or use restrictions.  
One of the reasons why the CJEU dismissed the Data Retention Directive as invalid (para. 59) was be-
cause “in particular, it is not restricted to a retention in relation (i) to data pertaining to a particular 
time period and/or a particular geographical zone and/or to a circle of particular persons likely to be 
involved, in one way or another, in a serious crime, or (ii) to persons who could, for other reasons, 
contribute, by the retention of their data, to the prevention, detection or prosecution of serious of-
fences”.  
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With the CJEU judgment in Tele2 Sverige AB of December 2016, there is no doubt left that any preven-
tative data retention must be “limited […] to what is strictly necessary”, “with respect to the categories 
of data to be retained, the means of communication affected, the persons concerned and the reten-
tion period adopted” [para. 108, emphasis added], these limitation criteria being explicitly cumulative, 
whilst the initial Data Retention judgment of 2014 (by the use of “and/or) still left the door open for 
data retention which would not be targeted in terms of also the “persons concerned” or the “public 
affected”. 
 
3. The data retention glass: Empty or half full? 
 
Against the backdrop of the above jurisprudence, and instead of getting stuck in the trenches, data 
protection authorities, intelligence services, law enforcement authorities and their oversight bodies, 
including at EU internal level, may want to constructively brainstorm about how to make sure that, 
irrespective of later access or use restrictions, preventative data retention, collection or storage for 
protecting internal security or crime fighting is sufficiently selective, in line with the standards set by 
the CJEU, in that it: 
- may not happen on a generalised basis; 
- may not be indiscriminate; 
- may not be bulk-collection; 
- must be limited to what is strictly necessary; 
- requires differentiation, limitation or exception in the light of the objective pursued; 
- must be targeted; 
- must be limited to data pertaining to a particular time period and/or a particular geographical 
zone and/or to a circle of particular persons 
- must be limited with respect to (cumulatively): 
- the categories of data to be retained; 
- the means of communication affected; 
- the retention period adopted; 
- the “persons concerned” or “the public that may potentially be affected”,  
- must be defined on the basis of objective evidence which makes it possible to identify a public 
whose data is likely to reveal a link, at least an indirect one, with serious criminal offences, and to 
contribute in one way or another to fighting serious crime or to preventing a serious risk to public 
security. 
 
4. The traps of using discriminants: Sensitive data, prohibited profiling and discrimination 
 
The use of discriminants in line with the above criteria may cause backfiring, in that it may require the 
processing of special (‘sensitive’) data categories, constitute prohibited profiling or result in prohibited 
discrimination. From an EU perspective, and looking ahead (may 2018), both Articles 9 and 22 GDPR 
(which inter alia applies to communications and social media providers) and Articles 10-11 Directive 
2016/680, (which applies to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes 
of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of crim-
inal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security), must 
be borne in mind. 
Article 9 GDPR - Processing of special categories of personal data 
1. Processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or 
philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, bio-
metric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health 
or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation shall be prohibited. 
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2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply if one of the following applies: 
[…]; 
(g) processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest, on the basis of Union or 
Member State law which shall be proportionate to the aim pursued, respect the essence of 
the right to data protection and provide for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the 
fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject 
[…] 
Article 22 GDPR - Automated individual decision-making, including profiling 
1. The data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on auto-
mated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or 
similarly significantly affects him or her. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply if the decision: 
(a) is necessary for entering into, or performance of, a contract between the data subject and 
a data controller; 
(b) is authorised by Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject and which 
also lays down suitable measures to safeguard the data subject's rights and freedoms and 
legitimate interests; or 
(c) is based on the data subject's explicit consent. 
[…]  
4. Decisions referred to in paragraph 2 shall not be based on special categories of personal 
data referred to in Article 9(1), unless point (a) or (g) of Article 9(2) applies and suitable 
measures to safeguard the data subject's rights and freedoms and legitimate interests are in 
place. 
Article 10 Directive 2016/680 - Processing of special categories of personal data 
Processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or 
philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, bio-
metric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health 
or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation shall be allowed only 
where strictly necessary, subject to appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of 
the data subject, and only: 
(a) where authorised by Union or Member State law; 
(b) to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; or 
(c) where such processing relates to data which are manifestly made public by the data sub-
ject. 
Article 11 Directive 2016/680 - Automated individual decision-making 
1. Member States shall provide for a decision based solely on automated processing, includ-
ing profiling, which produces an adverse legal effect concerning the data subject or signifi-
cantly affects him or her, to be prohibited unless authorised by Union or Member State law 
to which the controller is subject and which provides appropriate safeguards for the rights 
and freedoms of the data subject, at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part 
of the controller. 
2. Decisions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be based on special categories 
of personal data referred to in Article 10, unless suitable measures to safeguard the data 
subject's rights and freedoms and legitimate interests are in place.  
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3. Profiling that results in discrimination against natural persons on the basis of special cate-
gories of personal data referred to in Article 10 shall be prohibited, in accordance with Union 
law. 
In connection with Article 11.3 Directive 2016/680 and the prohibition of (either direct or indirect) 
discrimination under EU law, it is instrumental to also bear Recital 38 in mind, which reads as follows: 
“[…] Profiling that results in discrimination against natural persons on the basis of personal 
data which are by their nature particularly sensitive in relation to fundamental rights and 
freedoms should be prohibited under the conditions laid down in Articles 21 and 52 of the 
Charter.”  
As for the requirement of ‘appropriate safeguards’ referred to in Articles 10-11 Directive 2016/680, 
inspiration may be drawn from recital 37: 
[…] Appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of the data subject could include the 
possibility to collect those data only in connection with other data on the natural person 
concerned, the possibility to secure the data collected adequately, stricter rules on the access 
of staff of the competent authority to the data and the prohibition of transmission of those 
data. […] 
 
5. Towards a Plan B?  
 
Taking stock of the above, best seems to commonly search for a (combination of) selectors and discri-
minants to guide selective data retention, based on objective evidence, workable and feasible for in-
telligence services and law enforcement authorities as well as for industries concerned, manageable 
for oversight bodies, in full conformity with data protection standards, including as regards sensitive 
data and profiling rules, and not resulting in (either direct or indirect) discrimination. Searching for the 
Holy Grail? 
 
From a doctrinal perspective, it may be helpful to brainstorm around possible selectors or discrimi-
nants based in terms of what they relate to, leading to a classification along the following lines: 
- ratione informationis (type of information the retention is envisaged of): subscriber data, traffic 
data, location data, access logs, content data, … 
- ratione personae (characteristics of targeted persons): age, gender, nationality, racial or ethnic 
origin, political opinion, religious or philosophical beliefs, membership (of an association, trade 
union, …), … 
- ratione loci (residence or presence of targeted persons): city, street, neighbourhood, public space, 
square, … 
- ratione itineris (targeted routes of communications or data flows, in terms of origin, transit, desti-
nation or combinations thereof): country/city/…, neighbourhood/building/…, server, company, 
hotspot, provider, … 
- ratione temporis (targeted period or time frame(s)): month/week/day/time-slot, event-based 
(concert, xmas market, football match, …), suspicious timings, … 
- ratione instrumenti (targeting persons using certain means of communication): use(rs) of certain 
communication means (Signal, Telegram, …), encryption tools, secure VPN’s, …, foreign (unregis-
tered) sim cards (roaming), … 
- etc. 
Visually, an explorative mapping exercise could then take the following form: 
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